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WASTE MANAGEMENT HOLDINGS v. GILMORE: THE
ANYTHING BUT DORMANT PROBLEM OF
INTERSTATE WASTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Disposing of municipal solid waste (MSW) has created a na-
tional problem that raises intricate technological and political is-
sues.1 The United States generates the largest amount of solid
waste in the world and the amount increases every year.2 At least
eighty percent of the solid waste is distributed in landfills across the
country.3 Landfill space, however, is rapidly diminishing and the
environmental repercussions of landfill use are quickly surfacing.4
In fact, experts project that nearly eighty percent of existing solid
waste landfills will close by the year 2009. 5 At that time, there will
not be sufficient waste disposal sites available to meet the increased
demands of MSW.6 Consequently, many states have resorted to ex-
porting their waste to other states, thus transforming a local prob-
lem into a national problem. 7
In an attempt to protect themselves, states that receive waste
from other states have enacted statutes to limit or restrict waste im-
portation. 8 Recipient states are often concerned with preserving
their available landfill space as well as protecting their citizens from
1. See Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 778 (4th Cir. 1996)
(discussing unconstitutionality of South Carolina law regulating hazardous wastes).
2. See Robert R.M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause, Environmental Justice, and the
Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (1997) (discussing rapid
growth of MSW in United States).
3. See id. (discussing problem of garbage disposal in America).
4. See id. (discussing diminishing landfill capacity and environmental
repercussions).
5. See id. As old landfills close, it is becoming more difficult to find adequate
sites. See id. Finding new sites is especially difficult as environmental concerns,
coupled with health hazards, surface with regard to the long-term repercussions of
landfill use. See id.
6. SeeJason Barocas, Note, Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton: Is
An "Open and Competitive" Bidding Process Really the Solution to National Waste Disposal
Problems?, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 393, 394 (2000) (discussing problem of insufficient
disposal sites and concept of open bidding process as solution to waste problems).
7. See James E. Breitenbucher, Yakety Yak, Take Your Garbage Back: Do States
Have Any Protection From Becoming the Dumping Grounds For Out-Of-State Municipal
Solid Waste?, 32 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 225, 227 (1997) (discussing state's
lack of protection from out-of-state MSW).
8. See Barocas, supra note 6, at 394 (discussing actions taken by waste recipient
states).
(315)
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the environmental hazards of landfilling, which threatens the envi-
ronment in various ways. 9 First, many landfills contain large quanti-
ties of toxic and hazardous materials. 10 Second, older landfills leak
contaminants into adjacent land or aquifers.1 Third, landfills can
generate uncontrolled amounts of methane into the air, which can
cause health and safety hazards. 12 Finally, landfills create a nui-
sance in neighboring communities due to the smell, increased traf-
fic, and an ever-growing and unwelcome rat population.13
As states have tried to deal with the effects of large-scale waste
importation, courts have continuously struck down waste restrictive
statutes as violating the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. 14 The courts' interpretation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause and their general reluctance to allow states to
limit the importation of waste has led to a significant environmental
problem where waste-export states are not held accountable for the
waste they produce. 15
This Note addresses the recent decision of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Waste Management Holdings Inc. v. Gilmore,16 in
which the court struck down most of a Virginia statute aimed at
restricting the transport and disposal of out-of-state MSW in Vir-
ginia.' 7 The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a majority of the statute's
provisions were unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce
9. See generally Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir.
2001) (discussing Virginia's attempt to safeguard environment and its citizens
from increased import of MSW).
10. SeeVerchick, supra note 2, at 1246-47 (discussing problems associated with
landfilling).
11. See id. (discussing negative effects of landfilling).
12. See id. Uncontrolled amounts of methane gas can cause safety hazards
and fire hazards as well. See id.
13. See id. (explaining detrimental consequences of landfilling and resident
opposition).
14. See Lincoln L. Davies, If You Give The Court A Commerce Clause: An Environ-
mental Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate Waste Jurispridence, 11 FoRDHAm
ENvrL. L.J. 207, 253 (1999) (discussing how recent federal and state court deci-
sions have invalidated state restrictions on transportation and disposal of out-of-
state MSW).
15. See Breitenbucher, supra note 7, at 229-31 (noting practical effect of judi-
cial interpretation of Dormant Commerce Clause).
16. 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001).
17. See id. at 349 (discussing Fourth Circuit's decision invalidating certain
waste restrictive provisions).
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Clause. 18 Part II presents the facts of Waste Management.19 Part III
outlines the background of the Dormant Commerce Clause and
past judicial decisions concerning the doctrine with respect to inter-
state waste. 20 Part IV provides both a narrative and critical analysis
of the Fourth Circuit's decision. 2 ' Finally, Part V discusses the over-
all impact of this decision.
22
II. FAcrs
In March and April of 1999, the state of Virginia enacted five
statutory provisions to curtail the importation of MSW that may be
accepted by landfills located in Virginia.2 3 The first statutory provi-
sion, the Cap Provision, caps the amount of waste a Virginia landfill
can accept.24 The second statutory provision, the Stacking Provi-
sion, prohibits stacking containerized waste more than two contain-
ers high on a barge. 25 This provision also allows for other
regulations associated with the shipment of waste via barge, ship or
vessel. 26 The third statutory provision, the Three Rivers' Ban, pro-
hibits "the commercial transportation of hazardous or nonhazard-
ous solid waste . . . by ship, barge, or other vessel upon the
18. See id. (contemplating Fourth Circuit's holding); see also Waste Mgmt.
Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 87 F. Supp. 2d 536, 544-45 (E.D. Va. 2000) (setting forth
district court's holding).
19. For a discussion of the facts of Waste Mgmt., see infra notes 23-45 and ac-
companying text.
20. For a discussion of the background and an overview of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, see infra notes 46-144 and accompanying text.
21. For the narrative and critical analysis, see infra notes 145-251 and accompa-
nying text.
22. For a discussion of impact of Waste Mgmt., see infra notes 252-59 and ac-
companying text.
23. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1408.1(q), 10.1-1408.3, 10.1-1454.1(A), 10.1-1454.2,
10.1-1454.3 (Michie Supp. 2000)) (discussing content of Virginia's statute concern-
ing MSW).
24. See id. Under the Cap Provision a Virginia landfill may accept either 2,000
tons of MSW per day or the average amount accepted by the landfill in 1998, de-
pending upon which is greater. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.3. The Cap Provi-
sion also allows Virginia's Waste Management Board to grant individual requests
for exceptions contingent upon a set of factors as well as the discretion of the
Board. See id.
25. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 323 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §10.1-1454.1(A)
(2001)) (discussing parameters of Stacking Provision and its intent to prevent es-
cape of waste in event of an accident).
26. See id. This provision calls for the creation of a Board to develop regula-
tions governing the transport of MSW by barge or other vessel. See VA. CODE ANN.
§10.1-1454.1 (2001). Some of the regulations to be considered by the Board in-
clude the issuance of permits and the design of watertight and secured transport
containers. See id.
20021
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navigable waters of the Rappahanock, James and York Rivers, to the
fullest extent consistent with limitations posed by the Constitution
of the United States." 27 The fourth statutory provision, the Truck-
ing Provision, prohibits vehicles with four or more axels from trans-
porting MSW "unless the transporter of the waste provides
certification, in a form prescribed by the Board, that the waste is
free of substances not authorized for acceptance at the facility."28
Finally, the fifth statutory provision, the Four or More Axel Provi-
sion, requires that the Board promulgate regulations governing the
"commercial transport" of MSW by "any tractor truck semi trailer
combination with four or more axels." 29
At the time these statutory provisions were enacted, Fresh Kills
landfill in Staten Island, New York, had recently announced that by
December 2001 it would cease accepting waste. 30 The New York
City Department of Sanitation negotiated interim disposal contracts
to phase out dependency on Fresh Kills. 31 Landfills in Virginia
were awarded two of these contracts and a third twenty-year con-
tract was in the process of being negotiated. 32 The third contract
contemplated the disposal of 12,000 tons of residential waste per
day that emanated from four of the five New York boroughs.33 If
the third contract is awarded to Virginia, sixty percent of New York
City's residential MSW would be deposited in Virginia landfills.3 4
27. Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 323 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1454.2 (2001))
(discussing Three Rivers' Ban Provision).
28. Id. at 323-24 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.1 (Q) (2001)) (discussing
Trucking Provision and its attempt to limit mass importation of waste through
large trucks). For statutory support for the creation of the monitoring board, see
supra note 26.
29. Id. at 325 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1454.3(A),(D)). "Among other
things, the Four or More Axel Provision provides that the new regulations require,
as a condition of carrying MSW on Virginia roads, the owners of such trucks to
make financial assurances that trucks having less than four axels or carrying other
cargo need not make." Id.
30. See id. at 325-26 (noting relevant background to enactment of Virginia's
statute).
31. See id. New York faced the challenge of exporting waste that had been
disposed of in Fresh Kills landfill for nearly fifty years. See id.
32. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 87 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (E.D. Va.
2000) (discussing New York City's interim disposal contracts).
33. See id. The four boroughs include Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn, and the
Bronx. See id. "In addition to the residential waste covered by existing and pend-
ing contracts, Waste Management also removes significant quantities of commer-
cial waste per day from New York City and surrounding communities." Id.
(emphasis omitted).
34. See id. One Virginia landfill, the Charles City Landfill, would be particu-
larly affected. See id. Furthermore, these contracts also require that the waste be
containerized and transported by barge. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 326.
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After Virginia enacted the five statutory provisions, several
landfill operators and transporters of MSW and one Virginia
County (Plaintiffs) commenced this action in the Eastern District of
Virginia.3 5 Plaintiffs brought this suit enjoining multiple individu-
als, including Virginia's Governor, James Gilmore, Virginia's Secre-
tary of Natural Resources, John Paul Woodley, Virginia's Director of
the Department of Environmental Control, Dennis Treacy (Defend-
ants).36 Plaintiffs challenged the Virginia statute arguing that the
provisions violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Contract
Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Con-
stitution. 37 Virginia asserted that these statutory provisions were
adopted as a legitimate exercise of its police powers to protect the
public health and to conserve Virginia's resources.3 8
Plaintiffs moved for Summary Judgment and on February 2,
2000, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted
Plaintiffs' motion, determining that Virginia's statutory provisions
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution.39 The
district court also held that the Three Rivers' Ban and the Stacking
Provision violated the Supremacy Clause under the Constitution. 40
The Defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit, challenging the
propriety of the district court's decision. 41
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor with re-
35. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 324 n.2. Plaintiffs consist of: (1) Waste Man-
agement Holdings, Inc. which operates large landfills in Virginia; (2) Weanack
Land Limited Partners which owns and operates a transfer facility on the James
River; (3) Hale Intermodal Marine Company, a barging company; (4) Charles City
County, which leases property to lease management for landfill use; and (5) Bruns-
wick Waste Management Facility, L.L.C., which owns and operates a large landfill.
See id. at 324.
36. See id.
37. See Waste Mgmt., 87 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (discussing Plaintiffs' argument that
all five statutory provisions are unconstitutional).
38. See id. at 538 (explaining Virginia's reasons for enacting statutory
provisions).
39. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 324 (discussing district court's decision grant-
ing Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment). The district court held that the
statutes discriminated facially against out-of-state interests thus justifying strict scru-
tiny review. See Waste Mgmt., 87 F. Supp. 2d at 542. Furthermore, Virginia had not
demonstrated that no adequate, non-discriminatory alternatives exist. See id.
40. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 324. The Supremacy Clause provides that the
"Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, and Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
41. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 324 (discussing Defendants' appeal to Fourth
Circuit).
2002] 319
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spect to their Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to the Cap
Provision, the Trucking Provision, and the Four or More Axel Provi-
sion.42 The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the district court's judg-
ment in favor of Plaintiffs concerning the Supremacy Clause
challenge to the Three Rivers' Ban. 43 The Fourth Circuit, however,
vacated and remanded the district court's grant of Summary Judg-
ment with respect to the Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to
the Three Rivers' Ban and the Stacking Provision. 44 The Fourth
Circuit also vacated and remanded the district court's grant of Sum-
mary Judgment with respect to the Supremacy Clause challenge to
the Stacking Provision. 45
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Commerce Clause
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause is rich with internal contradictions. 46 The Commerce
Clause states that "Congress shall have Power... To regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States. '47 While the Commerce
Clause is an affirmative grant to Congress, between the carefully
crafted words, the Supreme Court has long recognized a corollary
doctrine referred to as the negative or dormant aspect of the Com-
merce Clause. 48 The Dormant Commerce Clause is ajudicially cre-
ated limit on a state's ability to regulate interstate commerce absent
congressional action.49 The justification behind this doctrine is
42. See id. at 349 (reporting Fourth Circuit's concurrence with district court's
holding that provisions violate Dormant Commerce Clause).
43. See id. (stating Fourth Circuit's decision to affirm district court's judgment
with regards to Supremacy Clause challenge to Three Rivers' Ban).
44. See id. (revealing Fourth Circuit's decision to vacate and remand because
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding health and environmental hazards
associated with stacking sealed shipping containers more than two high on
barges).
45. See id. (discussing decision to vacate and remand district court's grant of
Summary Judgment with respect to Supremacy Clause challenge of Stacking
Provision).
46. See Richard A. Epstein, Waste & The Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 GREEN BAG
2D 29, 29 (1999). "The most evident of these [contradictions] is the stark contrast
between the intellectual precommitments to the affirmative use of the commerce
power on the one hand and dormant, or negative, use of the commerce power on
the other." Id.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
48. See Davies, supra note 14, at 230-31 (discussing concept of environmental
justice in connection with Supreme Court interstate waste jurisprudence).
49. See Benjamin T. Kurten, National Solid Wastes Management Association v.
Meyer: Another Strike Against a State's Ability To Save its Landfill 3 Wis. ENV-rL. L.J.
245, 250 (1996). The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from promoting
6
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that the nation is one common market "in which state lines cannot
be made barriers to the free flow of both raw material and finished
goods in response to the economic laws of supply and demand.
50
The Dormant Commerce Clause provides for an efficient and free
interstate trade market and serves to protect residents from burden-
some or discriminatory laws for which they cannot vote.5 1
The Dormant Commerce Clause is not without criticism. 52 Ma-
jor criticisms of the Dormant Commerce Clause include its lack of
textual and historical foundation and the absence of support in the
Constitution for the negative inference.5 3 While The Federalist pa-
pers are cited as historical support for the Framers' intent, the ori-
gin of the Dormant Commerce Clause is not overwhelmingly
apparent. 54 Another criticism is that the Dormant Commerce
Clause upsets the balance of power created by the Constitution by
granting a power not delegated in the Constitution to the judici-
ary.55 An additional but related criticism is that the Dormant Com-
merce Clause limits the power given to the states by the
Constitution. 56 Despite unyielding criticism, the Dormant Com-
merce Clause continues to be recognized by courts as a living and
their own internal economic interests by limiting the movement of out-of-state arti-
cles. See id.
50. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976) (discussing
justification behind Dormant Commerce Clause).
51. See Davies, supra note 14, at 231. Although these justifications may be
based on sound policy and some historical reasoning, the Supreme Court still rec-
ognizes that the doctrine is entirely theoretical. See id. at 231-32.
52. See id. at 243-61 (illustrating traditional critiques of Dormant Commerce
Clause such as lack of textual and historical foundation).
53. See id. at 245-47 (critiquing Dormant Commerce Clause).
54. See id. Both proponents and opponents of the Dormant Commerce
Clause cite to James Madison's statement in an 1829 letter to a friend. See id. at
246. Madison stated that the Commerce Clause was "intended as a negative and
preventive provision against injustice among the [s]tates themselves, rather than as
a power to be used for the positive purposes of the General Government, in which
alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged." Id. (quoting letter from
James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS OFJAMES MADISON 14, 15 (1867)). Depending upon whether the interpreta-
tion of"general government" means the judiciary or the legislature, the statement
could be used to support either side. See id.
55. See id. at 248-50 (discussing how Dormant Commerce Clause grants power
to judiciary by judiciary and not through Congress)..
56. See Davies, supra note 14, at 249-52 (arguing that "[b]y giving the federal
government a power not explicitly granted to it by the Constitution, the doctrine
fundamentally betrays the compromise of federalism reached by the Framers.").
2002]
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viable doctrine with almost limitless bounds.57 Interstate waste dis-
posal is one area in which the doctrine is alive and flourishing. 58
B. Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
The Supreme Court has adopted a two-tiered analysis to ex-
amine a statute challenged under the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 59 The first tier applies when a state law is discriminatory
facially, in its practical effect or purpose.60 This tier is usually re-
ferred to as "a virtually per se rule of invalidity."'61 If it is deter-
mined that a statute is discriminatory either facially, in its practical
effect or in its purpose, it will most likely be struck down. 62 The
Fourth Circuit, in Sylvia Development Corporation v. Maryland,63 enu-
merated several factors which were deemed probative of whether a
decision-making body was motivated by discriminatory intent.64
Those factors included: (1) evidence of a consistent pattern of dis-
parate impact; (2) historical background; (3) the specific sequence
of events leading to the decision; and (4) contemporaneous state-
ments of the decision-makers. 65 In order for such a discriminatory
57. See id. at 253 (noting courts continue to use Dormant Commerce Clause
but its application is unpredictable). The inconsistent application of the Dormant
Commerce Clause has resulted in confusion among the courts as they struggle to
form a coherent framework. See id.; see also Epstein, supra note 46, at 31 (discussing
how court utilized Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to limit exercise of state
power).
58. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001) (exploring contours of
Dormant Commerce Clause with respect to Virginia statute, limiting importation
of out-of-state waste).
59. See Frank P. Grad, RCRA, the Business of Waste Disposal and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause Now Wide Awake, SC 56 ALI-ABA 629, 630 (1998) (discussing different
tests applied under Dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
60. See Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir. 1996); see
also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992) (citing City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
61. See Verchick, supra note 2, at 1272. This per se rule of invalidity is a strict
scrutiny test. See id. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey established this strict scrutiny
test. See id. (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 427 U.S. 617 (1978)).
62. See Barocas, supra note 6, at 400-01 (citing C & A Carbone v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994)) (explaining if law is found to be discrimina-
tory on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect then law is per se unconstitutional).
63. 48 F.3d 810 (4th Cir. 1995).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 819.
Several factors have been recognized as probative of whether a decision-
making body was motivated by a discriminatory intent, including: (1) evi-
dence of a "consistent pattern" of actions by the decision making body
disparately impacting members of a particular class of persons; (2) histor-
ical background of the decision, which may take into account any history
of discrimination by the decisionmaking body or the jurisdiction it repre-
sents; (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the decision being
8
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law or statute to survive, the state has the burden of demonstrating
that the discriminatory law is justifiable by a valid factor unrelated
to economic protectionism and that there are no other nondiscrim-
inatory alternatives to preserve the local interests at stake.66
The second tier of the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis ap-
plies if the state law regulates evenhandedly, having only incidental
effects on interstate commerce. 67 If the state law has an indirect or
incidental effect on interstate commerce and regulates evenhand-
edly, the court usually applies a balancing test to determine the
constitutionality of the state law.68 This balancing test is derived
from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.69 The burden imposed on interstate
commerce is weighed against the putative local benefits. 70 If there
is a legitimate local interest, the test is one of degree.71 It should be
noted, however, that the distinction between the per se rule of inva-
lidity and the Pike balancing test is not always clear. 72
C. Judicial Application of Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
Concerning Waste Restrictive Statutes
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,73 the Supreme Court first
addressed a state's limitation on interstate shipment and importa-
tion of waste under the Dormant Commerce Clause.74 This case
typifies the Supreme Court's position on interstate waste in both
challenged, including any significant departures from normal proce-
dures; and (4) contemporary statements by decisionmakers on the record
or in minutes of their meetings.
Id.
66. See New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274-75 (1998)
(finding Ohio statute unconstitutional because it discriminated against interstate
commerce); see also Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342-45
(1992) (holding state did not meet its burden in proving other nondiscriminatory
alternatives existed to alleviate its waste importation concern).
67. See Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)) (discussing second tier of
Dormant Commerce Clause test).
68. See id. (commenting upon applicability of Pike balancing test).
69. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 137 (1970) (revealing balancing
test used to weigh burden on interstate commerce against putative local benefits).
70. See id. at 142.
71. See Kurten, supra note 49, at 252 (characterizing Pike balancing test as test
of degree).
72. See Envtl. Tech. Counci 98 F.3d at 785 (explaining uncertainty which exists
between when to apply per se rule and when to apply Pike balancing test).
73. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
74. See id. (holding statute that prohibited import of MSW violated Com-
merce Clause); see also Breintenbucher, supra note 7, at 234 (discussing City of
Philadelphia).
2002]
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result and analysis. 75 In City of Philadelphia, New Jersey enacted a
statute prohibiting the importation of most "solid or liquid waste
which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of
the State." 76 The Supreme Court began its analysis by determining
that waste is an object of commerce. 77 The Court concluded that
that the New Jersey law was discriminatory "on its face and in its
plain effect" and was therefore invalid. 78
The Supreme Court distinguished the New Jersey law from
other "quarantine" cases where exceptions to the Commerce
Clause had been made. 79 According to the majority, trash did not
fit the quarantine exception because trash does not have to be dis-
posed of immediately, while objects in other "quarantine" cases, as
a result of their very movement, must be quickly discarded. s0 Be-
cause the Court determined that the NewJersey law was outside the
scope of a quarantine law, the Supreme Court held that the New
Jersey law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.81 The Supreme
Court's main contention was that the law "falls squarely within the
area that the Commerce Clause puts off limits to state regulation
... [w] hat is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate itself from
a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the move-
ment of interstate trade. '82
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented in
City of Philadelphia, noting that solid waste has enormous negative
environmental effects that states must be empowered to regulate.83
The dissent argued that "New Jersey should be free under our past
75. See Davies, supra note 14, at 232 (explaining importance of City of Philadel-
phia to judicial landscape of interstate waste).
76. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 618 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:111 et
seq. (1973)) (discussing parameters of New Jersey statute).
77. See Davies, supra note 14, at 233 (discussing Supreme Court's analysis in
City of Philadelphia).
78. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27 (explaining New Jersey's law was
discriminatory and therefore invalid).
79. See id. at 628-29 (discussing quarantine exception to Commerce Clause
and how it does not apply to New Jersey's law).
80. See Davies, supra note 14, at 234 (discussing Supreme Court's analysis of
why New Jersey's law did not fit quarantine exception to Commerce Clause).
81. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628-29 (explaining NewJersey law falls
outside quarantine exception and therefore violates Dormant Commerce Clause).
82. Id. at 628 (explaining why New Jersey's law violates Dormant Commerce
Clause).
83. See Davies, supra note 14, at 234 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's dis-
sent in City of Philadelphia).
10
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precedents to prohibit the importation of solid waste because of the
health and safety problems that such waste poses to its citizens."8 4
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court ignored the environ-
mental concerns raised by the dissent in City of Philadelphia and ex-
panded its holding that import restrictions of waste violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause. 85 Fourteen years after City of Philadel-
phia, the Supreme Court struck down another waste restricting stat-
ute in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of
Natural Resources.86 In Fort Gratiot, Michigan enacted a Solid Waste
Management Act which stated that counties could not landfill waste
generated outside their borders unless they received prior approval
from their County Solid Waste Planning Committee.8 7 In a 7-2 de-
cision, the Supreme Court struck down Michigan's statute as dis-
criminatory, because the statute authorized each county to refuse
waste from the national economy and gave local waste producers
protection from out-of-state competition seeking to use local dispo-
sal areas.8 8 Striking down the Michigan law, the Court suggested
that Michigan could "for example, limit the amount of waste that
landfill operators may accept each year" as a method of avoiding
discriminating between in-state and out-of-state waste.89 This mea-
sure, however, was not in the Michigan statute and was not an
issue .90
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented
in Fort Gratiot, arguing that the Michigan statute advanced local en-
84. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 632 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent
argued, "The physical fact of life that NewJersey must somehow dispose of its own
noxious items does not mean that it must serve as a depository for those of every
other state .... The Court's effort to distinguish these prior [quarantine] cases is
unconvincing." Id.
85. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992). This case demonstrates the Supreme Court's reluctance
to address environmental concerns implicated by the interstate transport of waste.
See id. at 354.
86. 504 U.S 353 (1992).
87. See id. at 357. The statute reads: "[a] person shall not accept for disposal
solid waste ... that is not generated in the county in which the disposal area is
located unless the acceptance of solid waste... that is not generated in the county
is explicitly authorized in the approved county solid waste management plan." Id.
88. See id. at 355 (holding Michigan statute discriminates against interstate
commerce). The Court concluded that "the Waste Import Restrictions unambigu-
ously discriminate against interstate commerce and are appropriately character-
ized as protectionist measures that cannot withstand scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause." Id. at 367-68.
89. See id. at 367 (articulating less burdensome alternative to managing waste
flow into Michigan).
90. See id. (discussing possible alternative for limiting flow of MSW into state).
2002] 325
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vironmental concerns and not economic protectionism. 9 1 In fact,
the statute worked to Michigan's economic disadvantage because of
the limited disposal volumes.9 2 The dissent suggested that the stat-
ute should be remanded for further consideration under the Pike
balancing test.93
The Supreme Court, again ignoring the environmental con-
cerns highlighted by the dissenting arguments, upheld the strin-
gent application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to waste in
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt.94 The Alabama state legis-
lature imposed an additional disposal fee on hazardous wastes gen-
erated outside of the state.9 5 The fee, however, did not apply to
hazardous waste originating from within the state. 96 Petitioner, an
operator of a commercial hazardous waste land disposal facility in
Alabama that received both in-state and out-of-state waste, chal-
lenged the statutory provision as violating the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 97 In this case, ninety percent of the hazardous waste landfil-
led within Alabama came from other states.98
The Supreme Court followed the reasoning in City of Philadel-
phia, holding that the additional fee did not serve any local interest
and Alabama could not isolate itself from a problem common to all
states. 9 9 Furthermore, the state's additional fee discouraged the
91. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 368-69 (discussing practical effect of Michigan
statute).
92. See id. at 370 (noting Michigan statute works to Michigan's economic dis-
advantage); see also Davies, supra note 14, at 236 (discussing Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent in Fort Gratiot).
93. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S at 371. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's interpretation of
the Commerce Clause contemplates the substantial environmental concerns asso-
ciated with landfilling. See Breintenbucher, supra note 7, at 251. A cost-benefit
analysis lends strong support for this view. See id. While out-of-state waste must be
treated the same as in-state waste, the practical cost is not at all equal. See id.
There are numerous in-state costs and risks which are substantial. See id. There is
the damage to the environment and the community as well as potential risk of
clean-up cost if future problems arise. See id.
94. 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (holding additional fee imposed by Alabama on haz-
ardous waste generated outside of Alabama and disposed of at commercial facility
in Alabama discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of Commerce
Clause).
95. Id. at 336. Surcharges on waste imported from other states can act as a
substitute for an import restriction and it can also serve to compensate a state for
the costs of importing and disposing of the waste. See Davies, supra note 14, at 237.
96. See Davies, supra note 14, at 237 (noting Alabama law does not apply fee to
waste originating from within Alabama).
97. See id. at 237-38 (discussing Petitioners' argument).
98. See id. at 237 (discussing origin of waste being disposed of in Alabama).
99. See Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. at 344-45 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978)). "In sum, we find the additional fee to be 'an
12
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full operation of the petitioner's facility. 100 In a similar case, Oregon
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of the State of
Oregon,101 the Supreme Court extended its analysis of surcharge
statutes and held that states may not charge different fees for in-
state and out-of-state waste. 102
To date, courts have been very reluctant to allow states to re-
strict or limit the flow of waste between states. 103 Courts seem un-
sympathetic to the fact that certain states bear the brunt of the
nation's waste management and disposal crisis.10 4
D. Judicial Exceptions
1. Death or Disease
The Supreme Court has upheld discriminatory laws where the
discrimination was justified by the threat of death or disease. 1 5 In
Maine v. Taylor,106 Taylor, an operator of a bait business, arranged
to have live golden shiners delivered to him from outside the
obvious effort to saddle those outside the State' with most of the burden of slowing
the flow of waste into the Emelle facility." Id. at 346.
100. See id. at 342. "Such burdensome taxed imposed on interstate commerce
alone are generally forbidden: '[A] State may not tax a transaction or incident
more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the
State.'" Id. (quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984)).
101. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
102. See id. at 108. Oregon imposed a $2.25 per ton surcharge on waste gen-
erated from other states and $0.85 per ton fee on waste generated within Oregon.
See id. at 93. The Court determined that the disparate surcharge based on the
origin of the garbage was discriminatory under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
See id. at 108. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing
that the surcharge was a fair compensation because "Oregon solid waste producers
do not compete with out-of-state businesses in the sale of solid waste." Id. at 112.
103. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Chemical Waste v.
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc., 511 U.S.
93 (1994). These cases demonstrate the judiciary's reluctance to allow states to
control the flow of waste amongst the states. See id.
104. See generally Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001). Virginia is the
second largest importer of MSW, however, this fact was incidental to the Fourth
Circuit as it struck down provisions of Virginia's statute enacted to deal with this
incredible influx of MSW. See id.; see also Verchick, supra note 2, at 1294. Current
evidence suggests that poorer states are the ones forced to accept a disproportion-
ate responsibility for waste disposal. See Verchick, supra note 2, at 1294. When the
net import of waste is more than a disposal site can adequately maintain and man-
age, it is the poorer area that must deal with the subsequent nuisances and envi-
ronmental hazards. See id.
105. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (demonstrating one in-
stance when Court upheld discriminatory state law under Dormant Commerce
Clause).
106. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
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state. 107 The shipment was intercepted because Maine had a provi-
sion making the import of wildlife illegal, specifically the import of
live baitfish.' 08 Taylor contended that Maine's import ban uncon-
stitutionally burdened interstate commerce.10 9 The Court held the
statute constitutional because importation of live baitfish into
Maine posed two significant threats to the unique and fragile Maine
fisheries. 110 First, Maine's own golden shiners would be at risk of
attack by three types of parasites prevalent only in out-of-state
baitfish.111 Second, nonnative species inadvertently placed in the
shipments could disturb Maine's aquatic ecology. 112 The Court
held that "[a]s long as a State does not needlessly obstruct inter-
state trade or attempt to 'place itself in a position of economic isola-
tion,' it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and
safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources." 1 3
Maine v. Taylor is often characterized as a "modern" quarantine
case, and many states facing a Dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenge have attempted to invoke this exception especially with re-
spect to waste.1 14 Nevertheless, courts have been unwilling to
recognize any significant correlation.1 15
107. See id. at 132 (discussing facts of case).
108. See id. A federal grand jury in the District of Maine indicted Taylor for
violating the Lacey Act Amendments. See id. These amendments make it a federal
crime "to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate
or foreign commerce... any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported or sold
in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law."
Id. at 132-33 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2002)).
109. See id. at 133 (noting Taylor's argument that Maine's import ban uncon-
stitutionally burdens interstate commerce).
110. See id. at 140-41 (discussing Supreme Court's holding where statute with-
stood strict scrutiny).
111. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 141 (discussing unique threat importation
of live baitfish would have on fragile Maine fisheries).
112. See id. at 141 (discussing second unique threat importation of live
baitfish would have on Maine's fragile fisheries).
113. Id. at 151 (explaining Court's reasoning for upholding ban on importa-
tion of live baitfish).
114. SeeVerchick, supra note 2, at 1278 (discussing exception Supreme Court
carved out in Maine v. Taylor). The Supreme Court's exception in Maine v. Taylor
remains a mystery for many. See id. Maine indeed had a means to test imported
fish, however, it would have been costly. See id. Furthermore, the Court failed to
consider why Maine has not already enacted protectionist provisions. See id. For
example, the same fish that were banned from Maine could swim into Maine from
New Hampshire. See id.
115. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holding Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001).
In Waste Management, the Fourth Circuit disregarded any application of the analysis
in Maine v. Taylor by distinguishing the two cases based on their facts. See id. at 344
n.10.
14
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2. Market Participant Doctrine
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,'1 6 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a state government can overcome the restrictions of the
Dormant Commerce Clause when it acts as a "market participant,"
as opposed to a "market regulator." 117 A state is a "market partici-
pant" when its role in the market is analogous to that of a private
company. 18 For example, the Commerce Clause does not allow a
state to regulate the market in favor of its own citizens, however, it
does not restrict a state when participating in the market to favor its
own citizens.11 9
The market participant doctrine has been limited in applica-
tion by the Supreme Court.120 The Court has indicated that the
exception may not apply when a state attempts to hoard its natural
resources. 121 The Supreme Court has also attempted to define the
116. 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (holding statutory scheme did not constitute imper-
missible burden on interstate commerce).
117. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 807-10. The Supreme
Court recognized the market participant exception for the first time in Hughes. See
id. In Hughes, the Court upheld Maryland's preferential treatment of state re-
sidents with respect to the purchase of abandoned cars. See id. The Court's rea-
soning for upholding Maryland's preferential treatment was that Maryland was
acting as a market participant. See id. The Court noted, "[n]othing in the purpose
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over others." Id. at 810. Subsequent cases affirmed the market participant
exception. See New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988) (de-
clining to apply market participant doctrine to facts but endorsing validity of doc-
trine); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980) (holding South
Dakota's preferential treatment of state residents with respect to sale of cement
produced by state-owned cement plant fell under market participant exception).
118. See Kurten, supra note 49, at 278 (explaining market participant
exception).
119. See Verchick, supra note 2, at 1280. "The doctrine... encourages states
to give up their traditional regulatory roles in the area of waste transportation and
to enter the fray of the market as one of many economic actors." Id. at 1281.
120. See Kurten, supra note 49, at 280-81 (discussing how Supreme Court has
limited market participant doctrine).
121. See id. There is a distinction between natural resources and state-created
resources. See id. States can be considered market participants when the landfill is
more than just land and requires state expenditure and human capital to facilitate.
See id. In Maryland, Rhode Island, and Washington, D.C. statutes were enacted
banning the disposal of MSW from out-of-state in publicly owned landfills. See id.
The Court upheld these statutes, reasoning that the involved governments were
participating in "landfill services" as opposed to "pure natural resource market."
See Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1218-19 (D.R.I. 1987) (deter-
mining validity of market participant exception with respect to state's ban on im-
portation of out-of-state MSW); Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp.
1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding ban on MSW from out-of-state valid under mar-
ket participant exception); County Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 473
A.2d 12, 21-22 (Md. 1984) (holding ban on importation of MSW from out-of-state
valid under market participant exception).
2002]
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contours of state involvement, stating that if there is no "direct state
involvement in the market," the Commerce Clause applies. 122
E. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), es-
tablishes minimum federal standards for dealing with hazardous
waste. 123 Most notably, RCRA allows states to implement their own
hazardous waste program instead of adhering to federal require-
ments. 124 In order to qualify, the state's program must be
"equivalent to" and "consistent with" the federal program and pro-
vide for "adequate enforcement of compliance." 125 Congress dele-
gated to EPA the task of overseeing and authorizing state
programs. 126 Some have argued that since RCRA authorizes the
creation of state programs, Congress intended to authorize state
discrimination against MSW generated out-of-state.127 The justifica-
tion behind this view is derived from the fact that EPA must ap-
prove each state program. 128 The issue of whether RCRA trumps
the Dormant Commerce Clause, though raised before the Supreme
Court, has never been decided. 129
Additionally, the issue has come before different circuit courts
without success.' 30 For example, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
122. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 592-93 (1997) (citing White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers,
Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983)) (noting in order to have protection of market
participant doctrine, state must directly participate in market).
123. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000)
[hereinafter RCRA] (setting minimal federal standards).
124. See id. (allowing states to implement their own programs upon EPA
approval).
125. Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 779 (4th Cir. 1996) (quot-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b)) (discussing parameters of RCRA).
126. See id. at 779 (noting EPA has authority over state-implemented pro-
grams pursuant to RCRA).
127. See id. at 782 (assessing argument that authorization of such state dis-
crimination would displace Dormant Commerce Clause).
128. See id. at 782-83 (discussing necessary Congressional intent to displace
Dormant Commerce Clause implications).
129. See id. at 783 n.13. Specifically, the Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue of Congressional intent under RCRA. See id. In Chemical Waste, the issue
was raised by the amici curiae, but the Court declined to decide the issue because
it was not raised or considered by the lower court. See id.
130. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 317 (4th Cir.
2001); Envtl. Tech. Counci4 98 F.3d 774, 775 (4th Cir. 1996). In both cases Plaintiffs
attempted to argue that Congress intended RCRA to trump the Dormant Com-
merce Clause. See Envtl. Tech. Council 98 F.3d at 775; see also Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d
at 317. The Court of Appeals disagreed in both cases. See id.
16
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without "unmistakably clear congressional intent to permit states to
burden interstate commerce" or "any further persuasive evidence
indicating that Congress intended to permit the states to directly or
by EPA authorization, to engage in actions otherwise violative of the
Commerce Clause," the argument lacks merit.131 It is unlikely that
circuit courts will carve out an exception to the Dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis under RCRA in light of the Supreme Court's
decisions in City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot.13 2
F. Virginia and Waste
Virginia is the nation's second highest waste importing state.133
In 1992, Virginia was the fifth largest importer of waste in the
United States.134 Virginia moved up three ranks by 1995, becoming
second only to Pennsylvania.13 5 In 1992, Virginia imported 1.5 mil-
lion tons of MSW. 1 36 By the end of 1998, this figure increased to
4.6 million tons of MSW.13 7 In just six years, the figure increased by
300 percent. 38 Figures for 1999 determined that Virginia took in
4.8 million tons of total waste. 139
One reason Virginia's MSW intake is so high is due to exports
from New York. 140 Since 1997, Fresh Kills, a New York landfill, has
slowly been decreasing its intake in anticipation of its closure by the
end of 2001 .141 Fresh Kills is located in Richmond County and is a
131. Envtl. Tech. Council, 98 F.3d at 783 (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council v. State of South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792 (4th Cir. 1991)) (noting
unmistakably clear Congressional intent is paramount in order to make justified
argument).
132. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (holding that
a state cannot restrict the flow of interstate waste); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Land-
fill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (reiterating holding in
City of Philadelphia).
133. See Davies, supra note 14, at 280-81 (noting Virginia's waste intake in
1992 compared to 1998).
134. See id. (discussing Virginia's rapid growth of waste intake).
135. See id. (commenting that such increase would lead to need for political
action).
136. See id. at 281 (noting Virginia's waste intake in 1992).
137. See id. (examining increase of waste in Virginia throughout 1990).
138. See Davies, supra note 14, at 281 (demonstrating percentile increase of
waste transported and deposited in Virginia).
139. See6 WASTE NEWS 35, (Jan. 29, 2001), available at 2001 WL 8865916 (dis-
cussing Virginia's waste intake).
140. See Patrick Golden, New York State's Recycling Exports Continue to Increase, 41
WORLD WASTES 10 (Oct. 1, 1998), available at 1998 WL 14436611. New York's
Fresh Kills landfill operated for a long period of time and was exceptionally large.
See id.
141. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 87 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (E.D. Va.
2000) (discussing disposal of MSW generated in New York City).
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3,000-acre landfill that has operated for nearly 50 years. 142 As a re-
sult, nearly 3.5 million tons of MSW generated in New York has to
be exported elsewhere. 143 Virginia was awarded two contracts with
New York for the export of MSW and is in the process of negotiat-
ing a third contract. 144
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
The Fourth Circuit, in Waste Management, considered whether
the district court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment. 45 The district court found that the 1999 Virginia stat-
ute, restricting the importation of MSW into Virginia landfills, was
unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Supremacy Clause. 146 The Fourth Circuit applied the two-tier test
to determine the constitutionality of the statute challenged under
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 147 The court analyzed the statute
under the first tier, contemplating whether the state law discrimi-
nates facially, in practical effect, or in its purpose.1 48 Because the
parties agreed that the statutory provisions were not facially discrim-
inatory against MSW generated outside Virginia, the court consid-
ered whether the statutory provisions discriminated in their
practical effect or in their purpose. 149
With respect to practical effect, the Fourth Circuit determined
that a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning the Cap
Provision, Stacking Provision, Three Rivers' Ban, Trucking Certifi-
cation Provision, and the Four or More Axel Provision.150 With re-
142. See Golden, supra note 140, at 10 (discussing size and location of Fresh
Kills landfill).
143. See id. (discussing impact of closing Fresh Kills landfill).
144. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 326 (4th Cir. 2001)
(discussing Virginia's contracts to import waste from New York). This third con-
tract considered the disposal of 12,000 tons of residential waste per day from Man-
hattan, Queens, Brooklyn and the Bronx for a period of twenty years. See id.
145. See id. at 324 (discussing lower court's holding and issue facing Fourth
Circuit).
146. See id. (discussing district court's holding).
147. See id. at 333 (analyzing two-tier approach utilized in determining consti-
tutionality of statutory provision challenged under Dormant Commerce Clause).
148. See id. (citing Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir.
1996)) (discussing approach taken in determining constitutionality of statutory
provision challenged under Dormant Commerce Clause).
149. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 334 (examining elements involved in part
one of two-tiered test).
150. See id. at 335. The Fourth Circuit found that it was unclear whether the
particular statute discriminated in practical effect, thus raising a genuine issue of
material fact. See id.
18
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spect to discriminatory purpose, however, the Fourth Circuit
determined the evidence clearly demonstrated that Virginia wanted
to protect itself from further increases in the level of MSW gener-
ated outside the state being dumped within the state's borders. 151
In fact, the court stated that, "[n] o reasonable juror could find the
statutory provisions at issue had a purpose other than to reduce the
flow of MSW from states with less strict limitations upon the content
of MSW than Virginia. 1 52
Once the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Virginia statute
was discriminatory in its purpose, the court shifted its focus to the
second tier, determining whether Virginia had a constitutionally
valid reason for its discrimination.1 5 3 Defendants bore the burden
of proffering sufficient evidence for each provision of the statute so
that a reasonable juror could determine that a valid reason ex-
isted. 154 Defendants' main argument was that the importation of
MSW from other states into Virginia raised significant health and
safety concerns not presented by Virginia waste. 155 Specifically, De-
fendants stressed that state laws concerning hazardous waste that
were not as encompassing or as strict as the Virginia statute create a
particularly acute problem.' 56 Defendants cited Maine v. Taylor to
151. See id. at 340-41. In order to determine whether there was a discrimina-
tory purpose, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the four factors set forth in Sylvia Dev.
Corp. v. Maryland. See id. at 336. These four factors include (1) evidence of a con-
sistent pattern; (2) the historical background of the decision; (3) the specific con-
sequence of events leading up to decision; and (4) decision-makers contemporary
statements. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Maryland, 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir. 1995). As
part of the analysis, the Fourth Circuit examined press releases which clearly illus-
trated a marked tension between Governor Gilmore and Rudolf Giuliani concern-
ing the export of New York waste to Virginia. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 336-40.
152. Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 340 (noting tension between Virginia and New
York Governors concerning New York's plan to export waste).
153. See id. at 341. Since the Fourth Circuit found a discriminatory purpose,
it applied strict scrutiny. See id. at 334.
154. See id. at 341 (citing Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785
(4th Cir. 1996)). To justify a provision, its supporters must show that it is "unre-
lated to economic protectionism, and that no non discriminatory alternatives ex-
isted." Id.
155. See id. at 341 (focusing upon environmental and health hazards associ-
ated with exporting municipal solid waste).
156. See id. at 341. The Fourth Circuit stated:
Defendants . . . offered evidence demonstrating . . .: (1) that certain
materials in MSW can be hazardous to human health; (2) that each state
has its own definition of MSW; (3) that "[w]hile one state may find it
appropriate to regulate strictly a certain type of solid waste, another state
may not be as aware of or concerned about the risks posed by that type of
item into the MSW stream"; (4) that Virginia law completely prohibits
potentially infectious items such as blood and urine from being disposed
of as MSW, while Maryland and North Carolina allow disposal of blood
and urine as MSW under limited circumstances; (5) that Virginia law pro-
2002]
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support Virginia's environmental and health concerns. 157 In Taylor,
the Supreme Court made an exception to the Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine stating that the law at issue was justified by the
threat of death or disease. 158
The Fourth Circuit found that the Defendants met their bur-
den of establishing a reason other than economic protectionism to
justify the statutory provisions.' 59 However, the Fourth Circuit
stated that Defendants not only had the burden of demonstrating
that valid factors existed for the discriminatory statute, but also
bore the burden of establishing that the statutory provisions were
the least discriminatory means of addressing Virginia's MSW con-
cern.' 60 In this regard, the Fourth Circuit addressed each statutory
provision independently.' 61 With respect to the Cap Provision, De-
fendants argued that, in order to deal with the increased level of
MSW, the import volume must be limited.1 62 Only then could Vir-
ginia adequately employ its police powers and effectively screen and
treat the waste for potential hazards. 163 The Fourth Circuit, like
Plaintiffs, disagreed with Defendants, noting that the "Cap Provi-
hibits urine from being disposed of as MSW while New York allows its
disposal as MSW without limitation; (6) that Maryland and New York al-
low hazardous waste generated at less than 100 kilograms per month to
be disposed of as MSW while Virginia does not; and (7) that unlike Vir-
ginia, Maryland and New York do not impose manifesting or tracking
requirements on hazardous waste from small quantity generators.
Id. at 341-42 (internal citations omitted).
157. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 341.
158. See id. The Defendants argued that the health and environmental
hazards associated with transporting large quantities of MSW should warrant the
Supreme Court's exception to discriminatory laws found in Maine v. Taylor. See id.
at 341-42; see also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986).
159. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 342 (noting Defendants provided sufficient
evidence demonstrating genuine issue of material fact existed as to justification of
statute).
160. See id. (discussing another important element under two-tier strict scru-
tiny test for determining constitutionality of statute challenged under Dormant
Commerce Clause).
161. See id. at 343-45 (examining whether each statutory provision was least
discriminatory alternative).
162. See id. at 342 (discussing Plaintiffs' argument with respect to Cap
Provision).
163. See id. at 342. The Defendants argued that adding inspectors was only
one component to the waste-screening process. See id. In fact, "high volumes of
waste make inspecting waste even more difficult and exacerbate an ongoing prob-
lem." Id. Screening waste not only includes visual inspection but also chemical
testing to determine whether other hazards exist which the human eye cannot
detect. See id. at 343. If unauthorized waste is found it must be removed and
processed. See id. With increased volumes of waste, Virginia argued that it would
have to develop specific treatment facilities and this process would slow operations,
lowering the daily intake to lower than 2,000-tons a day. See id.
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sion makes no effort to distinguish between the MSW of states ac-
cording to an individual state's level of MSW regulation."' 164
Therefore, because other alternatives existed, the exception noted
in Taylor did not apply a65
With respect to the Stacking Provisions and the Three Rivers'
Ban, the Fourth Circuit determined that these were the least dis-
criminatory alternatives. 166 The Fourth Circuit relied on sworn
statements from the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ) that outlined serious and unique health threats as a result of
waste transportation via water to determine that a genuine issue of
material fact existed to deny Summary Judgment. 167 However, as to
the Trucking Certification Provision and the Four or More Axel
Provision, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Defendants failed to
prove that these were the least burdensome alternatives.1 68 Defend-
ants argued that the court should give the same deference to these
provisions as is given to state legislatures in the area of highway
safety. 169 The Fourth Circuit found this argument weak in light of
the discriminatory purpose of the Provisions.1 70 The court thus up-
held the Plaintiffs' grant of Summary Judgment. 171
164. Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 343. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that inter-
state commerce would be burdened less if the Cap Provision only applied to states
with standards lower than Virginia's standard or the Cap Provision should vary
according to the standards of other states. See id. The Fourth Circuit stated that
because Virginia did not present evidence why it would not work, Virginia did not
meet its burden under the second prong of the strict scrutiny test. See id.
165. See id. at 344 n.10 (noting that Maine v. Taylor does not apply to this
situation because issue here is materially distinguishable).
166. See id. at 344 (holding that genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether Stacking Provision and Three Rivers' Ban were least discriminatory
alternatives).
167. See id. The Fourth Circuit cited interrogatories from the record which
indicated that, in 1993, thirty-three containers fell overboard due to improper lash-
ing and, in 1994, a fire partially destroyed cargo on board a ship. See id.
168. See id. The Fourth Circuit stated that Defendants failed to show affirma-
tive evidence and instead relied on deference normally given to state legislation
regarding highway safety. See id.
169. See Waste Mgmnt., 252 F.3d at 344-45 (discussing Plaintiffs' argument that
deference should be given to legislative judgments regarding highway safety).
170. See id. at 344-45 (citing Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662, 675-76 (1981)). The Fourth Circuit relied on Kasse, which stands for the
proposition that less deference should be given to legislative judgments that bear
disproportionately on out-of-state residents and businesses. See id. at 344. The
Fourth Circuit also noted that because the statute was found to be discriminatory
in its purpose, Virginia's political process would not serve as a check against un-
duly burdensome regulations. See id. at 345.
171. See id. at 345 (finding that Trucking Provision and Four or More Axel
Provision were not least burdensome alternatives).
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Defendants sought to avoid confrontation with the Dormant
Commerce Clause altogether by asserting two separate grounds that
the Fourth Circuit should consider.172 First, Defendants sought
protection under the market participant doctrine. 17 The Fourth
Circuit dismissed the application of this doctrine in three
sentences.1 74 Specifically, the court determined that the Dormant
Commerce Clause applied in full force in this instance because the
state was acting as a market regulator and not a private
participant.175
Second, the Defendants argued that, under RCRA, Congress
intended to authorize state implementation programs that discrimi-
nate against MSW, thus overriding the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 176 The Fourth Circuit relied on Environmental Technology
Council v. Sierra Club177 to support its contention that, in order to
allow a state law to be removed from the reach of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, Congressional intent must be expressly stated or
unmistakably clear. 178 The court noted that Defendants had the
burden of identifying congressional intent.179 Here, Defendants
pointed to a RCRA provision, encouraging the states to consider
certain factors in assessing and addressing their solid waste
problems to argue that Congress gave the states the authority to
protect local interests.' 80 Defendants also asserted that certain leg-
islative history demonstrated that Congress intended state pro-
172. See id.
173. See id. (discussing market participant doctrine as exception to Dormant
Commerce Clause).
174. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 345 (noting court only briefly considered
market participant doctrine).
175. See id. (citing Waste Mgmt. Holdings Inc. v. Gilmore, 64 F. Supp. 2d 537, 544
(E.D. Va. 1999)). The district court noted:
The Commonwealth's argument that the market participant exception
applies to this case requires little discussion. Virginia is not acting like a
private participant in the waste disposal market. It is attempting to regu-
late the conduct of others in that market as only a state, as state, can do.
The market participant doctrine therefore offers it no protection.
Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
176. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 245.
177. 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996)
178. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 346 (discussing requirements for state law to
be removed from reach of federal law).
179. See id. at 346-47 (discussing standard for unmistakable Congressional
intent).
180. See id. at 346; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6942(c) (2000). The factors Defendants
referred to included population density, population growth, geographical and
hydrolic characteristics as well as political, financial and management problems
affecting waste management. See id.
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grams to override the Dormant Commerce Clause.1 81 The Fourth
Circuit simply stated that the language Defendants cited was broad
and did not "come close to expressing an 'unmistakably clear' in-
tent on the part of Congress." 182
Lastly, the Fourth Circuit addressed Plaintiffs' argument that
the Three Rivers' Ban and the Stacking Provision violated the
Supremacy Clause under the Constitution. 183 The first question
the Court addressed was whether state law conflicted with federal
law.184 The Fourth Circuit noted that states are permitted to exer-
cise their police powers as long as the state law does not prohibit
the accomplishment of the full purpose and objective of the federal
law. 18 5 Under the Supremacy Clause, vessels having appropriate
documentation may engage in coastwide trade. 186 Here, the Vir-
ginia statute completely excluded federally licensed commerce on
three waterways. 187 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether federal law
should preempt state law in light of the health and environmental
risks associated with stacking containers more than two barges
high. 188
181. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 346-47. Defendants cited numerous "snip-
pets" of legislative history. See id. One clip included, "[I] n formulating a state plan
it is the Committee's intention to permit wide flexibility on the part of the state
developing such plan so that each state can plan for its particular problems." See
id. at 346 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1491 at 35 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N
6238, 6273).
182. Id. at 347 (internal citation omitted) (holding that language Defendants
cited does not demonstrate Congress' unmistakable intent).
183. See id. at 347-48. The real issue revolved around the federal documenta-
tion provisions governing vessels in coastwide trade and whether states could en-
croach on this regulation. See id. at 348.
184. See id. at 348. "The Supreme Court has held that a federal license con-
fers upon the licensee a right to operate freely in each state's waters, subject only
to legitimate exercises of the state's police power." Id. (citing Douglas v. Seacoast
Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 281 (1977).
185. See id. at 348 (noting that, in light of state police powers, states may regu-
late federal licensees in reasonable, non discriminatory manner).
186. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 348 (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 12103, 12106
(2000)) (discussing parameters of Supremacy Clause).
187. See id. at 348 (discussing provision of Virginia statute and reasonableness
of state encroachment upon federal provision).
188. See id. (holding genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to
whether state law preempts federal law under Supremacy Clause).
2002]
23
Korot: Waste Management Holdings v. Gilmore: The Anything but Dormant Pr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
338 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. XIII: p. 315
B. Critical Analysis
The Fourth Circuit's decision, in Waste Management, is consis-
tent with previous Supreme Court interstate waste decisions.18 9
However, the Fourth Circuit's analysis demonstrates the difficulty
lower courts have in applying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
independent facts.190 Yet, the court's analysis in some areas pro-
vides a new approach for considering environmental and health
concerns, mirroring some of Chief Justice Rehnquist's arguments
in his dissenting opinions.191
1. Discriminatory Purpose is Not Unmistakably Clear
The Fourth Circuit examined the first tier of the two-tier statu-
tory test for statutes challenged under the Dormant Commerce
Clause to determine whether the law discriminates facially, in its
practical effect or purpose.1 92 The Fourth Circuit determined that
the evidence "unmistakably" demonstrated that the statute was en-
acted with a discriminatory purpose. 193 The court followed the fac-
tors set forth in Sylvia Development Corporation v. Maryland and held
that "the record in this case established that no reasonable juror
could find that in enacting the statutory provision at issue Virginia's
General Assembly acted without a discriminatory purpose."1 94 The
evidence the court relied upon were press releases and statements
from Senator Bolling, Mayor Giuliani, and Governor Gilmore.1 95
Yet, loathing for imported garbage by a few does not mean it is
despised by an entire General Assembly. 196 Furthermore, discern-
ing legislative intent is a very hazy endeavor over which the Su-
189. See Davies, supra note 14, at 290-91 (discussing how holding of Waste
Management is consistent with Supreme Court's view of interstate waste).
190. See id. at 247-53 (discussing difficulty lower courts have in applying Dor-
mant Commerce Clause).
191. For a discussion of Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions in previous
interstate waste cases, see supra notes 83-84 and 92-93 and accompanying text.
192. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 333-34 (discussing Dormant Commerce
Clause test).
193. See id. at 340 (noting that Virginia statute had an unmistakable discrimi-
natory purpose).
194. Id. at 336 (citing Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Maryland, 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir.
1995)) (noting four factors worthy of consideration when determining whether
statute discriminates on its purpose). For a discussion of the four factors discussed
in Sylvia, see supra note 65.
195. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 336-41 (discussing evidence Court relied
upon to find discriminatory purpose).
196. See Davies, supra note 14, at 290 (noting that thoughts of few legislators
cannot be determinative of every legislator's view).
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preme Court has often struggled. 97 Despite Defendants' attempt
to demonstrate the statute's neutrality, the Fourth Circuit did not
consider factors other than the political feud between New York
and Virginia in its analysis. 198
In order to determine whether the Virginia statute discrimi-
nated in its purpose, the court could have looked at the legislative
history and the increased amount of MSW being disposed of in Vir-
ginia before the beginning of the feud with New York. The Virginia
statute created an evenhanded restriction on how MSW could enter
Virginia and be disposed of once in the state. 199 The same restric-
tions were placed on in-state and out-of-state MSW. 200 The Virginia
statute did not seek to cease importing waste from out-of-state, but
to reduce the amount of waste coming to the state per day.201
Moreover, Virginia argued that, despite the political fervor between
New York's Mayor Giuliani and Virginia's Governor Gilmore, the
statute was enacted for neutral reasons stemming from the concern
of the rapid growth of MSW being deposited in Virginia.20 2 The
court dismissed this contention, finding the evidence of discrimina-
tion clear.20 3
In light of the Supreme Court's previous holdings striking
down state statutes that sought to limit or restrict the amount of
MSW being imported into a state, it is not surprising that the
197. See id. (citing Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism
in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History
Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. Rrv. 1 (1998)) (exploring difficulty determining
legislative intent).
198. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 341. Defendants attempted to argue that the
statute was implemented for neutral reasons seeking to protect the health, safety
and welfare of Virginia residents. See id.
199. See id. at 323-24 (discussing five statutory provisions).
200. See id. For example, both in-state and out-of-state waste was subject to the
2,000-ton Cap Provision as well as the Trucking Provision. See id. at 324.
201. See id. at 342-43. Defendants relied on statements by Virginia's director
of DEQ who asserted that the cap statute was enacted to allow the Commonwealth
to better protect health and safety. See id. at 342.
202. See id. at 340. Defendants contended that a genuine issue of material
fact existed with respect to whether the statute was enacted with a discriminatory
intent. See id. Defendants suggested that a post-enactment statement from Sena-
tor Boiling demonstrated that the statute was enacted for neutral reasons. See id.
Senator Bolling stated that he sponsored the statute because of his concern over
the rapid growth of the volume of MSW being deposited in Virginia landfills "re-
gardless of the source." Id. The court, however, dismissed Defendants' contention
that a genuine issue of material fact existed and stated "[d] efendants cannot create
a genuine issue of material fact by presenting conflicting sworn statements as they
have done with respect to the issue of discriminatory intent." Id. at 341. (citing
Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984)).
203. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 341 (holding discriminatory purpose was
clear).
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Fourth Circuit found the Virginia statute to have a discriminatory
purpose.20 4 However, one of the most critical aspects of the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis is determining whether a statute
should be analyzed under the first or second tier of the test.20 5 If
discrimination is found, the Court's standard of review is strict scru-
tiny.20 6 Strict scrutiny is a powerful tool that has been used to inval-
idate almost all waste restrictions.20 7
2. Reasons Other than Economic Protectionism
The Fourth Circuit correctly applied the second prong of the
first tier test under a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.20 8
Once a court determines that the statute is discriminatory on its
face, purpose, or effect, the two-tier test requires the court to ask
whether Virginia has a constitutionally valid reason for engaging in
such discrimination. 20 9 Defendants presented evidence outlining
numerous environmental, health, and safety hazards that result
from MSW and the transport of MSW. 210 Furthermore, Defendants
204. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see also Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
In both of the above-cited cases the Supreme Court struck down statutes in which
the state tried to mitigate the effects of imported waste. See id.
205. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 340 (demonstrating that if statute is found to
be discriminatory on its face, practical effect or purpose, then strict scrutiny will be
applied).
206. See id.
207. See Verchick, supra note 2, at 1272. "The Court's rigidity in applying the
[Dormant] Commerce Clause is inconsistent with other areas of constitutional
analysis and is much harder to justify on traditional constitutional grounds." Id. at
1283.
208. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 342 (agreeing that safety risks justified stat-
ute on grounds other than economic protectionism).
209. See Envtl. Tech. Council, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir. 1996) (setting forth
two-tier approach for determining constitutionality of statutory provision chal-
lenged under Dormant Commerce Clause).
210. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 341-42. Defendants offered evidence:
1) that certain materials in MSW can be hazardous to human health; 2)
that each state has its own definition of MSW; 3) that while one state may
find it appropriate to regulate strictly a certain type of solid waste, an-
other state may not be as aware of or concerned about the risks posed by
that type of item into the MSW stream; 4) that Virginia law completely
prohibits potentially infectious items such as blood and urine from being
disposed of as MSW, while Maryland and North Carolina allow disposal of
blood and urine as MSW under limited circumstances; 5) that Virginia
law prohibits urine from being disposed of as MSW while New York allows
its disposal as MSW without limitation; 6) that Maryland and New York
allow hazardous waste generated at less than 100 kilograms per month to
be disposed of as MSW while Virginia does not; and 7) that unlike Vir-
ginia, Maryland and New York do not impose manifesting or tracking
requirements on hazardous waste from small quantity generators.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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demonstrated that MSW generated outside of Virginia is different
from that which is generated inside Virginia and, therefore, poses
more serious health and safety risks.211 The court correctly noted
that Defendants satisfied their burden of establishing that the statu-
tory provisions were justified by a reason other than economic
protectionism. 21 2
The Fourth Circuit's finding that there was sufficient evidence
that the Virginia statute was enacted for ajustified reason steps away
from the Supreme Court's original analysis of the nature of inter-
state waste in City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot.2 13 In both cases,
the Supreme Court found undisputed economic, protectionism.2
14
In City of Philadelphia, the Court stated, "whatever [New Jersey's]
ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating
against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless
there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differ-
ently."215 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the notion that
environmental concerns and hazards posed by landfilling satisfied
burdening commerce.21 6
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the Virginia statute
could be construed as a health and safety regulation, adopting
some of the ideas scattered throughout Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in both City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot.2 17 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinions largely addressed environmental
hazards connected with interstate waste and noted that states
should be free to prohibit the importation of solid waste because of
the potential health and safety problems that it poses to re-
211. See id. at 342 (noting that "MSW generated outside Virginia poses health
and safety risks not posed by MSW generated inside Virginia.").
212. See id. (noting statutory provisions did not advance economic protec-
tionism).
213. See id. (finding health and safety risks Defendant presented sufficient to
establish reasons for enactment outside economic protectionism).
214. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (holding
NewJersey law is protectionist in nature); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 334, 366 (1992) (holding portion of Michi-
gan law as protectionist measure that cannot withstand scrutiny under Commerce
Clause).
215. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27 (discussing possibility of finding
evil of protectionism in both legislative means and legislative ends).
216. See id. at 628 (noting that one state cannot isolate itself from problems
common to many states by erecting barrier). The Court rejected Defendants' con-
tention that this statute fits within the quarantine exception, thus validating the
protectionist nature of the statute. See id. at 628-29.
217. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 343 (stating health and safety risks presented
by importation of MSW with less strict regulatory standards could establish justified
reason for statute).
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sidents.2 18 The Fourth Circuit's willingness to consider environ-
mental hazards as a sufficient reason for the statute is an affirmative
acknowledgement that waste disposal is an important issue which
must be reevaluated. 219
3. Least Discriminatory Means
While the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the statutory pro-
visions were justified by a reason other than economic protection-
ism, the court's analysis of the last part of the Dormant Commerce
Clause requires evaluation. 220
a. Cap Provision - The Wrong Outcome
Concerning the Cap Provision, the Fourth Circuit found that
less discriminatory means of regulation existed.221 Defendants con-
tended that the Cap Provision was a necessary and appropriate re-
sponse to the MSW volume crisis. 222 Defendants stated that the
Cap Provision allowed Virginia to better protect the health and
safety of its citizens because a 2,000-ton cap of MSW can be reasona-
bly managed and policed.223 In response, Plaintiffs argued if De-
fendants worried about the composition of MSW generated outside
of Virginia, then Virginia should only cap the amount of waste im-
ported from states with MSW regulatory schemes less restrictive
than Virginia. 224 Additionally, the closer a state's MSW regulatory
scheme mirrors that of Virginia, the higher the cap should be.225
218. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 632 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent focused on the environmental concerns associ-
ated with landfilling and suggested that states should be able to protect their citi-
zens from these potential health and safety hazards. See id. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause test suggests that
courts should give substantial weight to the local health and environmental bene-
fits of landfill reduction provisions. See Breitenbucher, supra note 7, at 251-53.
219. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 341-42 (evaluating environmental hazards
Defendants presented).
220. See id. at 342 (discussing least discriminatory prong of test under Dor-
mant Commerce Clause challenge).
221. See id. at 343-44 (finding less discriminatory means existed).
222. See id. at 342-43 (arguing Cap Provision was necessary to police out-of-
state MSW).
223. See id. at 342 (contending more inspections can take place to adequately
screen and process waste with less MSW being imported each day).
224. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 343 (noting Plaintiffs' contention that less
discriminatory means outside universal cap provision existed). Plaintiffs also
noted that the Cap Provision could be less restrictive by making the cap corre-
spond to Virginia's regulatory scheme. See id. For example, the more closely a
state's MSW regulatory scheme is to Virginia's, the higher the cap should be. See
id.
225. See id. (discussing Plaintiffs' example of less burdensome alternative).
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The Fourth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs, noting that Defendants
showed no evidence as to why a more narrow capping provision
would not adequately address the health and safety concerns the
Virginia statute was enacted to protect.226
While Plaintiffs' contention that a tailored Cap Provision is less
discriminatory, practically, a scheme like this poses significant chal-
lenges of its own. A narrower capping provision based on each
state's MSW regulatory scheme contravenes the principles of uni-
formity, an issue important to interstate commerce. 227 Such a pro-
vision would require Virginia to analyze each state's regulatory
scheme for MSW and create different caps based on their find-
ings. 228 With new technology, Virginia would have to continuously
change, update and revise the Cap Provision, inevitably causing
confusion and perceptions of disproportionate discrimination.
A uniform Cap Provision is a more evenhanded restriction
which would allow all states the same access to the landfills but
would allow Virginia a greater opportunity to manage its waste. 229
In fact, the Supreme Court condoned such a statutory scheme in
both City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot.230 The Supreme Court
noted that one plausible method of dealing with the influx of out-
of-state waste would be to limit or slow the flow of all waste into the
state's landfills, even though interstate commerce may be inciden-
tally affected.231 The Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed and
226. See id. (demonstrating less restrictive alternative to Cap Provision).
227. See id. at 333. The Fourth Circuit noted that if a statute regulates even-
handedly, the second tier of the Dormant Commerce Clause test applies instead of
the strict scrutiny, per se invalid tier of the test. See id. If a statute regulates even-
handedly, the Pike balancing test is applied. See id. (citing Envtl. Tech. Council v.
Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir. 1996)).
228. See id. at 343 (discussing Fourth Circuit's opinion regarding less discrimi-
natory alternative). The Fourth Circuit stated, "rather than discriminating against
MSW from every state other than Virginia, Virginia's cap should only target the
MSW from states that have lesser health and safety standards regarding MSW than
Virginia." Id.
229. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 342-43 (discussing Virginia's argument that
Cap Provision is necessary precaution).
230. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S 617, 626 (1978); see also Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 367
(1992). In both City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot, the Supreme Court suggested
that an evenhanded overall limitation on the amount of waste being imported into
a state would be a reasonable provision. See id.
231. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S at 626; see also Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 367.
In both City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot, the Court stated that a feasible alterna-
tive would be to create a uniform flow restriction affecting all waste coming into
the state. See id. The Court seemed to reason that a provision like this would be
less discriminatory against out-of-state waste and would regulate more evenhand-
edly. See id. The Fourth Circuit did not agree with this determination. See Waste
Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 343.
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thought that a variant Cap Provision would be less discriminatory
towards interstate commerce. 23 2
The Virginia statute followed the limited guidance provided by
the most analogous Supreme Court cases and still failed to over-
come a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. 233 Here, a uniform
Cap Provision as well as a state tailored Cap Provision are better
options than a complete ban on interstate waste or a surcharge to
deal with processing the more contaminated MSW. 234 The Fourth
Circuit agreed with the alternative Plaintiffs devised; however, be-
cause the court only had to determine whether a genuine issue of
material fact existed, it seems that a trier-of-fact should have been
used in this case to determine whether Plaintiffs' suggested alterna-
tive, if feasible, was indeed less discriminatory. 23 5
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit, in
agreeing with Plaintiffs that a less discriminatory means existed,
suggested that a Cap Provision would be acceptable as long as it was
tailored to the individual states or whether a Cap Provision could
only be applied to those states whose regulatory schemes were less
stringent than Virginia. 23 6 The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the Cap
Provision is confusing and demonstrates how the Supreme Court's
analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause has resulted in lower
courts issuing incoherent and inconsistent decisions. 23 7 Dormant
Commerce Clause cases are so disparate that no state legislators,
lawyers, law students, academic authorities or the courts themselves
know clearly the analysis or rules concerning the Dormant Com-
merce Clause. 238 Overall, the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the Cap
Provision lacks structure, but, more importantly, leaves Virginia
232. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 343 (stating other less discriminatory alterna-
tives were available).
233. See id. at 349 (indicating complexity of Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis).
234. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629 (holding prohibition of im-
portation of interstate waste was violation of Commerce Clause).
235. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 329 (describing court's limited scope of re-
view when reviewing grant of summary judgment).
236. See id. at 343-44. The Fourth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs' contention
that capping those states with less stringent regulatory schemes would be a less
discriminatory method. See id. Plaintiffs, however, also noted that "the more
closely a state's MSW regulatory scheme tracks that of Virginia, the higher the cap
should be." Id. The Fourth Circuit did not clarify whether it agreed with this
analysis as well. See id.
237. See Davies, supra note 14, at 252-54 (discussing how Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine has caused havoc for lower courts).
238. See id. at 254 (discussing disparate and unpredictable results of Dormant
Commerce Clause cases).
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without a clear understanding of what options it has for redesigning
the provision should it choose to do so.
b. Stacking Provision and the Three Rivers' Ban
The Fourth Circuit determined that Defendants submitted suf-
ficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether the Stacking Provision and the Three Rivers' Ban were the
least discriminatory alternatives available. 239 The Fourth Circuit
strayed from the Supreme Court's traditional Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis demonstrated in City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot
by focusing on the environmental concerns of Virginians with re-
spect to the Stacking Provision and the Three Rivers' Ban.240 The
Fourth Circuit determined that Defendants' evidence showed that
the transport of,waste through the waterways presented serious and
unique health and safety threats to Virginia residents. 241 While this
conclusion is not determinative, the Fourth Circuit's approach
demonstrates the recognition and importance of health concerns
involved with waste management. 242 In fact, the Fourth Circuit's
argument correlates to Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opin-
ions in City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot.243 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's dissents imply that the Dormant Commerce Clause, as
interpreted by the majority, produces potential environmental and
health problems of its own because it increases the distance waste
has to travel. 244 Increased distance inevitably creates increased risks
of spills, contamination and other environmental concerns.245 The
239. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 344 (noting Defendants offer various pieces
of evidence to create genuine issues of material fact with regard to Stacking Provi-
sion and Three Rivers' Ban, requiring resolution by trier-of-fact).
240. See id. The Fourth Circuit seriously considered reports from DEQ sug-
gesting that these provisions were necessary to protect the health and safety of
Virginia citizens. See id. The court stated that Defendants submitted sufficient evi-
dence to create genuine issues of material fact that should be resolved by a trier-of-
fact. See id.
241. See id. (noting health and safety concerns involved with transport of
waste via waterway).
242. See id.
243. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629-33 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (discussing disagreement with majority holding based on envi-
ronmental, health, and safety concerns); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 368-73 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing) (illustrating basis of disagreement with majority holding based on state's legit-
imate local concerns rather than improper economic protectionism).
244. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629-33; For Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 368-
73.
245. See Davies, supra note 14, at 259 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinions). An additional environmental criticism of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, important to the doctrine's practical effect but omitted from Chief
20021 345
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Fourth Circuit seemed to be heeding these warnings as it evaluated
Virginia's concerns in enacting these provisions.246
c. Trucking Provision and the Four or More Axel Provision
The Fourth Circuit correctly determined that the Trucking
Provision and the Four or More Axel Provision were not the least
discriminatory alternatives. 247 Defendants argued that state legisla-
tion should be given deference because it was analogous to highway
safety.248 The Fourth Circuit properly noted that these regulations
disproportionately pressed upon out-of-state residents and busi-
nesses and therefore less deference was due. 249 Furthermore, the
Fourth Circuit stated that because the provisions were determined
to be discriminatory in their purpose, less deference should be
given to state legislative judgment because the presence of a dis-
criminatory purpose undercuts the notion that Virginia's political
process would serve as a check against burdensome legislation. 250
The court assumed that the entire legislature was acting with a dis-
criminatory purpose when they enacted the statutory provisions. 251
The court's assumption demonstrates how critical an accurate and
thorough analysis of the first tier of the Dormant Commerce Clause
test is to the final outcome.
V. IMPACT
The Fourth Circuit's decision, in Waste Management, is likely to
have little effect upon the judicial landscape of interstate waste.
This is partially due to the fact that the Fourth Circuit's holding was
based on a Summary Judgment determination. The fact that the
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions, is the idea of risk multiplication. See id.
Allowing an unlimited amount of trash to be deposited in one state increases that
state's risk of being harmed. See id. at 259-60. For example, Virginia's waste impor-
tation has increased dramatically as a result Fresh Kills' closing. See id. Without
any restriction or limit on the amount of waste Virginia will accept, Virginia re-
sidents' exposure to harmful contaminants is increased proportionately to the in-
creased amount of trash. See id.
246. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 344 (discussing environmental hazards).
247. See id. at 345 (striking down Trucking Provision and Four or More Axel
Provision).
248. See id. at 344-45 (discussing Defendants' argument with respect to Truck-
ing Provision and Four or More Axel Provision).
249. See id. (citing Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-76
(1981)) (explaining less deference should be given to legislative judgment where
local regulation bears disproportionately on out-of-state residents and businesses).
250. See id. at 345 (noting discriminatory purpose of Trucking Provision and
Four of More Axel Provision and commenting Virginia's political process would
not serve as check against potentially burdensome legislation).
251. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 344-45.
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WASTE MANAGEMENT
Fourth Circuit determined that Defendants had met their burden,
does not mean that the provision is constitutional. Furthermore,
Waste Management is not overwhelmingly significant because it is a
circuit court decision and the Supreme Court has already addressed
the issue of interstate waste. The Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Dormant Commerce Clause with respect to interstate waste may
not be completely logical in light of environmental hazards con-
nected with landfilling, but the Supreme Court's protection of in-
terstate commerce might as well be set in stone. 252
On the other hand, "[o] ne generation's dissents have often be-
come the rule of law years later."25 3 :The. Fourth Circuit strayed
from the traditional Supreme Court analysis which focused on eco-
nomic protectionism and ignored environmental concerns. 254 In-
stead, the Fourth Circuit adopted a subtle but modern approach to
considering state statutes challenged under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause.255 The court's recognition and discussion of the en-
vironmental, safety, and health hazards that the importation of
MSW poses demonstrates the nature of the MSW disposal crises in
the United States. The Fourth Circuit seemed to acknowledge
Chief'Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, understanding that the importation of waste is a multi-fac-
eted operation in which states should be able to protect their citi-
zens and resources. 256 However, while this approach projects a
more humanitarian view toward waste disposal and may be emu-
lated in subsequent cases, it is unlikely that health, safety, or envi-
ronmental concerns will be enough to overcome the Supreme
Court's protection of interstate commerce.
While the Supreme Court as currently constituted seems un-
likely to overrule itself on this issue, small acknowledgements of the
environmental and health implications of interstate waste by the
lower courts and Congress may lend a helping hand. Congress has
the authority to regulate interstate commerce; waste control is in-
252. See Davies, supra note 14, at 232 (discussing unlikelihood that Supreme
Court will ever overrule Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
253. Breitenbucher, supra note 7, at 249 (noting possibility of subsequent
changes in Supreme Court's views).
254. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis, see supra notes 202-239
and accompanying text.
255. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis concerning environmen-
tal, safety, and health hazards, see supra notes 201-211, 227-36 and accompanying
text.
256. See id. (discussing Fourth Circuit's consideration of environmental
factors).
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cluded under the Commerce Clause. 257 Since Fresh Kills in Staten
Island has closed its doors, the issue has a greater certainty of reach-
ing Congressional debate.258 In fact, several bills are pending in
the House of Representatives that would give states authority to reg-
ulate solid waste imports.259 Nevertheless, until Congress embraces
this national problem, states face a continual uphill battle to save
their landfill space and protect the health and safety of their
citizens.
Mia Korot
257. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
258. See Patrick Golden, supra note 140, at 10. In light of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks Fresh kills has reopened temporarily to deal with the massive
disposal of debris as a result of the two fallen towers. Seejim Johnson, Cleaning Up
a Horror: Crews Work to Remove Mountains of Debris After Terrorist Attack, 7 WASTE NEWS
10 (Sept. 17, 2001) available at 2001 WL 8866742.
259. See Solid Waste: State Officials Urge House Passage of Bill Allowing Restrictions
on Shipments, STATE ENVIRONMENT DAILY, August 3, 2001 (discussing need for con-
gressional action in order for states to have degree of control over type and
amount of waste brought into local communities).
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